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I would like once again to thank you for 
awarding me this honor last year. Given the 
scholars between whom I am sandwiched, the 
first honoree, Ingram Olkin, and next year’s, 
Joel Levin, I must try very hard to act as though 
the committee did not make a serious mistake 
with my nomination. Tonight, I’d like to focus 
on some of the work of R. A. Fisher, who would 
have been 120 years old now, to make a couple 
of points of my own. I hope that some of what I 
say will give you the same feeling of fun in the 
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Early Years: Up to 1922 
Fisher held two chairs in genetics, at 
University College in London and then at 
Cambridge but, surprisingly, was never a 
professor of statistics. Regarding Fisher’s 
accomplishments in statistics, Savage (1976) 
commented that it would be easier to list the few 
topics in which he was not interested. “In the art 
of calculating explicit sampling distributions, 
Fisher led statistics out of its infancy, and he 
may never have been excelled in this skill” (p. 
449). 
There is much, of course, about which 
Fisher was right. Despite his shunning the 
concept of Type II errors, Fisher (1928) was the 
first to provide formulas for the noncentral Chi-
square, t, and F distributions. (The symbol F was 
introduced by Snedecor in honor of Fisher, “for 
which officiousness,” according to Savage, 
“Fisher seems never to have forgiven him” (p. 
449)). There once existed a fair amount of 
disagreement regarding how to count degrees of 





Pearson (among others) claiming rc − 1 and 
Fisher (1922) correcting to (r − 1)(c − 1). Fisher, 
of course, was right here. Fisher was a pioneer in 
nonparametric statistics, having suggested the 
use of the sign test in place of the t-test in certain 
designs, and having introduced what he called 
exact tests to avoid the assumption of normality 
in many circumstances. 
According to Stigler (2005, p. 33), of 
Fisher’s 97 publications from 1912 to 1920, 91 
were in the Eugenics Review, two were on 
genetics related to eugenics, two were papers 
published in The Messenger of Mathematics, and 
the other two (in 1915 and 1920) were on 
mathematical statistics. I’ll focus briefly on the 
1915 and 1920 papers, as described by Stigler 
(2005, 2006). 
Mathematically, the 1915 derivation of 
the distribution of the sample correlation 
coefficient was the kind of work to which we all 
strive. Fisher found the distribution, expressions 
for moments, transformations (r-to-z) and 
distributional relationships (including his earlier 
work on the Student’s t-distribution), 
expressions for the bias of r, and the maximum 
likelihood estimator of ρ. 
 
Right Nice Stuff 
This type of work led Neyman (1951), 
in his review of Fisher’s Contributions to 
Mathematical Statistics (1950), to describe 
Fisher as “a very able ‘manipulative’ 
mathematician” (p. 406). The Contributions 
contain prefatory comments by Fisher on the 
various papers. For the 1915 paper, Fisher wrote 
“Here the method of defining a sample by the 
coordinates of a point in Euclidean hyperspace 
was introduced...” (p. 87). Unfortunately, 
according to Neyman (1951), representing the 
sample by a point in space was used for a similar 
purpose by Karl Pearson in 1900 and - Neyman 
suspected - had probably been used even before 
that; thus, Fisher was wrong in this regard. 
During the year following the 
publication of Fisher’s article on the correlation 
coefficient, Kirstine Smith (1916), working at 
Karl Pearson’s laboratory, published an article 
suggesting that when fitting a frequency curve 
with grouped data, the constants should be 
estimated using a minimum Chi-square criterion. 
She illustrated the use of this criterion through a 
series of examples. She stated that compared to 
the use of the minimum Chi-square method of 
fit, other approaches were arbitrary, including 
what she termed “the Gaussian ‘best’ value,” (p. 
262) the maximum likelihood approach from 
error theory that Fisher had supported in a paper 
he wrote as an undergraduate student in 1912. 
According to Stigler (2005), in response to a 
letter and manuscript that Fisher submitted to 
Biometrika, Karl Pearson as editor told Fisher 
that he had to demonstrate the logic of 
maximum likelihood, to justify it being better 
than Smith’s approach. For a while Fisher could 
not respond. 
The basis for Fisher’s reply came, 
possibly by accident (Stigler, 2005), in the late 
spring of 1919. Fisher was considering the 
relative merits of two alternative estimates of the 
standard deviation of a normal distribution: one 
was based on the mean absolute deviation, the 
other the maximum likelihood solution. He had 
considered combining the two estimates in some 
way but instead discovered that the whole of the 
information regarding σ, which a sample 
provides, is summed up in the value of the 
maximum likelihood estimator. Not only did it 
have a smaller standard deviation, it was, in a 
word, sufficient. 
On November 17, 1921, Fisher read a 
paper to the Royal Society of London entitled 
On the Mathematical Foundations of 
Theoretical Statistics. The paper opened with a 
set of definitions that were, in 1921, entirely 
new to statistical theory, but which are now 
familiar; they include consistency, efficiency, 
estimation, likelihood, optimum, and 
sufficiency. Stigler (2005) pointed out that not in 
the list is “…another, even more basic statistical 
concept: It is in this paper of Fisher’s that the 
word ‘parameter’ is first used in the modern 
statistical sense” (p. 32). Stigler notes that the 
word parameter appears 57 times. 
According to Fisher, a consistent 
estimate is called efficient if it is asymptotically 
normal and if it has the minimum asymptotic 
variance (Neyman, 1951). In his 1908 paper, 
however, Edgeworth expressed the idea that 
maximum likelihood estimates are always 
efficient and made several attempts to prove his 
conjecture. The proofs, however, “…of the 
efficiency of maximum likelihood estimates 
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offered both by Edgeworth and by Fisher are 
inaccurate, and the assertion, taken in its full 
generality, is false” (Neyman, 1951, p. 407). So 
Fisher was wrong in the assertion, the proof, and 
in not giving Edgeworth some credit for priority. 
Summarizing Fisher’s work, Neyman 
(1951) wrote, “…three major concepts were 
introduced by Fisher and consistently 
propagandized by him in a number of 
publications. These are mathematical likelihood 
as a measure of the confidence in a hypothesis, 
sufficient statistics, and fiducial probability,” (p. 




Fisher (1947) felt that “the null 
hypothesis is never proved or established, but is 
possibly disproved, in the course of 
experimentation. Every experiment may be said 
to exist only in order to give the facts a chance 
of disproving the null hypothesis” (p. 16). 
Regarding the rate of error to assign to an 
incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis, Fisher 
wrote (1926) that “it is convenient to draw the 
line at about the level at which we can say: 
‘Either there is something in the treatment, or a 
coincidence has occurred such as does not occur 
more than once in twenty trials.’” “A scientific 
fact,” he went on, “should be regarded as 
experimentally established only if a properly 
designed experiment rarely fails to give this 
level of significance” (p. 504). Further, Fisher 
(1973) wrote, “…in the vast majority of cases 
the work is completed without any statement of 
mathematical probability being made about the 
hypothesis or hypotheses under consideration. 
The simple rejection of a hypothesis, at an 
assigned level of significance, is of this kind and 
is often all that is needed, and all that is proper, 
for the consideration of a hypothesis in relation 
to the body of experimental data available” (p. 
40). This all seems right. 
Regarding Type II errors, Fisher (1947) 
wrote that “the notion of an error of the so-called 
‘second kind,’ due to accepting the null 
hypothesis ‘when it is false’ may then be given a 
meaning in reference to the quantity to be 
estimated. It has no meaning with respect to 
simple tests of significance, in which the only 
available expectations are those which flow 
from the null hypothesis being true” (p. 17). 
Thus, Fisher felt that one could not commit a 
Type II error, because one never drew a 
conclusion on the basis of a non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis. As he wrote (Fisher, 1973), “To 
a practical man, also, who rejects a hypothesis, it 
is, of course, a matter of indifference with what 
probability he might be led to accept the 
hypothesis falsely, for in his case he is not 
accepting it” (pp. 41-42). Some rightness to this 
is evident. 
Fisher always desired to establish a 
correct theory of statistical inference. According 
to Kempthorne (1976) “Fisher really did think 
that one could develop by logical reasoning a 
probability distribution for one’s knowledge of a 
physical constant” (p. 496). Fisher, as Neyman 
(1951) pointed out, seemed proud to have 
formulated a measure of rational belief. Thus, 
Fisher (1973) wrote that the level of significance 
“in such cases fulfils the conditions of a measure 
of the rational grounds for the disbelief it 
engenders” (p. 43). Similarly, Fisher (1925a) 
had observed that “if the value of P so calculated 
turned out to be a small quantity such as 0.01, 
we should conclude with some confidence that 
the hypothesis was not in fact true of the 
population actually sampled” (p. 90).  
In similar vein, Fisher (1935c) stated 
“more generally, however, a mathematical 
quantity of a different kind, which I have termed 
mathematical likelihood, appears to take its 
place as a measure of rational belief…” (p. 40). 
In addition, Fisher (1973) commented that “the 
actual value of P obtainable from the table by 
interpolation indicates the strength of the 
evidence against the hypothesis” (p. 80). And 
finally he also stated (1973) “What has now 
appeared is that the mathematical concept of 
probability is, in most cases, inadequate to 
express our mental confidence or diffidence in 
making such inferences, and that the 
mathematical quantity which appears to be 
appropriate…I have used the term ‘Likelihood’” 
(pp. 9-10). There is a whole lot of wrong here, as 
a measure of rational belief - even if obtainable - 
provides a theory with no level of 
epistemological virtue. 
Note that even Neyman (1956) was not 
immune to this inductive probability infection, 





error rate “…the numerical values of 
probabilities of errors of the second kind are 
most useful for deciding whether or not the 
failure of a test to reject a given hypothesis 
could be interpreted as any sort of 
‘confirmation’ of this hypothesis” (p. 290). 
 
Fiducial Probability and Fiducial Intervals 
Fisher (1935b) wrote on fiducial 
probability and fiducial intervals, about which 
he stated, “This form of argument leads in 
certain cases to rigorous probability statements 
about the unknown parameters of the population 
from which the observational data are a random 
sample, without the assumption of any 
knowledge respecting their probability 
distributions a priori.” His argument seems 








= , Fisher noted that 
the probability statement P(t > tα) = α can be 
solved in terms of μ to yield 
( / )P x t s nαμ α< − = . Fisher believed that 
this probability statement holds even after the 
sample values are substituted. Conversely, 
Neyman and Pearson contended that at that 
point, the probability is either zero or one. 
Neyman (1956) offered a counter-argument in 
terms of two flips of a fair coin, where the 
variable Y is the number of heads appearing. So 
it may be written that P(Y = 1) = 0.5 before the 
experiment. If Y = 2 is observed, Fisher would 
say the probability statement holds after 
substituting, or that P(2 = 1) = 0.5. Fisher 
appears to be wrong in this case. 
To summarize, in Neyman’s (1951) 
words, “Unfortunately, in conceptual 
mathematical statistics Fisher was much less 
successful than in manipulatory, and of the three 
above concepts only one, that of a sufficient 
statistic, continues to be of substantial interest. 
The other two proved to be either futile or self-
contradictory and have been more or less 
generally abandoned” (p. 407). As may be 
observed, it is fiducial probability that Neyman 
considered self-contradictory, and I agree that a 
search for a measure of rational belief is futile. 
Thus, for Fisher, one out of three right will have 
to do. 
Personality 
Fisher was not always charming and 
gracious, and his running battles with Neyman 
are well known. Regarding Karl Pearson, he 
wrote, “Pearson’s energy was unbounded. In the 
course of his long life he gained the devoted 
service of a number of able assistants, some of 
whom he did not treat particularly well. He was 
prolific in magnificent, or grandiose, schemes 
capable of realization perhaps by an army of 
industrious robots responsive to a magic wand” 
(1973, p. 2).  
In similar vein, in a prefatory note on 
Fisher’s Contributions to Mathematical 
Statistics is a personal attack on Sir Karl: “If 
peevish intolerance of free opinion in others is a 
sign of senility, it is one which he had developed 
at an early age. Unscrupulous manipulation of 
factual material is also a striking feature of the 
whole corpus of Pearsonian writings, and in this 
matter some blame does seem to attach to 
Pearson’s contemporaries for not exposing his 
arrogant pretensions” (p. 437). On multiple 
occasions, Fisher (1958) criticized the ability of 
mathematicians to do science; for example he 
wrote “…with mathematical symbols, they are 
of course experts. But it would be a mistake to 
think that mathematicians as such are 
particularly good at the inductive logical 
processes which are needed in improving our 
knowledge of the natural world, in reasoning 
from observational facts to the inferences which 
those facts warrant” (p. 261). Judging by most of 
those in this audience, I believe that Fisher was 
wrong in this. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
It is not clear why Neyman did not 
include analysis of variance among Fisher’s 
major accomplishments. Perhaps, as seems 
possible, it was due to personal enmity. Fisher’s 
first paper on this subject, with W. A. 
Mackenzie, was published in 1923. According to 
Cochran (1980), “two aspects of this paper are 
of historical interest. At that time, Fisher did not 
fully understand the rules of analysis of 
variance—his analysis is wrong—nor the role of 
randomization” (p. 17), but by the time 
Statistical Methods for Research Workers came 
out in 1925, he was back on top of his game. 
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Fisher was the first to discuss Neyman’s 
1935 paper regarding analysis of variance in 
randomized blocks and Latin Square designs, 
Statistical Problems in Agricultural 
Experimentation, presented to the Royal 
Statistical society. In this paper, Neyman 
formulated a model that allowed each treatment 
to respond differently in each plot, making no 
assumption that treatment effects were fixed and 
additive in the plots. As noted by Holschuh 
(1980), “the null hypothesis he [Neyman] 
considered was that the average treatment 
response over the entire experimental area was 
the same for all treatments. Under this null 
hypothesis, he found that the z-test for the 
randomized block design was unbiased” (p. 43) 
but that the test for the Latin square design was, 
in general, not unbiased (z is one-half the natural 
log of the F-statistic). If it is assumed that the 
correlation of plot errors is unity, the z-test is 
unbiased. 
Fisher (1935) began his comments by 
writing, “…he [Fisher] had hoped that Dr. 
Neyman’s paper would be on a subject with 
which the author was fully acquainted, and on 
which he could speak with authority…Since 
seeing the paper, he had come to the conclusion 
that Dr. Neyman had been somewhat unwise in 
his choice of topics” (p. 154). Fisher focused 
primarily on Neyman’s analysis of the z-test for 
treatment effects. Fisher scolded Neyman for 
obtaining the wrong result for the Latin square 
design and said that he may have been “misled 
by his excessive use of symbolism” (Holdschuh, 
1980, p.43). 
Fisher, however, had ignored Neyman’s 
null hypothesis. The null hypothesis Fisher 
entertained was that in any plot the treatments 
have the same effect. In that case the correlation 
of plot errors is unity and Neyman’s conclusion 
is correct: the z-test is unbiased. In the course of 
the discussion, Neyman (1935) exposed Fisher’s 
error, but Fisher then claimed that the z-test was 
only intended to test the null hypothesis of 
identical treatment effects. Neyman replied that 
he was “considering problems which are 
important from the point of view of agriculture” 
(p. 173). 
Neyman (1935) began his written 
response sarcastically, writing: 
 
I am grateful to Professor Fisher for a 
sentence in the third part of his 
contribution…: ‘I suggest that before 
criticizing previous work it is always 
wise to give enough study to the subject 
to understand its purpose…’ The 
sentence I have quoted applies to its 
author, Professor Fisher, himself, who 
not only criticized my paper, but blamed 
me for a variety of sins of which I am 
not guilty—all this before apparently 
taking the trouble to discover what my 
paper is about and what are the results. 
According to him: I was unwise in the 
choice of my topics, I have been 
speaking of things with which I am not 
fully acquainted, I deceived myself on 
so simple a question, I forgot the 
meaning of the facts, I confuse the 
questions of estimation and the tests of 
significance and I am apparently not 
able to grasp the very simple argument!” 
(p. 174) 
 
Here, again, Fisher seems to have been wrong. 
It is in his book Design of Experiments 
(1935a) that Fisher described a method that all 
have come to know to be defective, except in 
special cases, that being Fisher’s Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) procedure. Fisher 
wrote (1935a) that if the F test is not significant 
in comparing yields of different varieties, 
“…they will not often need to be considered 
further,” whereas if the test was significant, he 
continued,  
 
…the null hypothesis has been falsified, 
and may therefore be set aside. We shall 
thereafter proceed to interpret the 
differences between the varietal yields 
as due at least in part to the inherent 
qualities of the varieties, as manifested 
on the conditions of the test, and shall be 
concerned to know with what precision 
these different yields have been 
evaluated. …In either case the square 
root of the variance gives the standard 
deviation, and provides therefore a 
means of judging which of the 
differences among our varietal yield 





regarded as well established, and which 
are to be regarded as probably 
fortuitous. If the experiment leaves any 
grounds for practical doubt, values may 
be compared by the t test… (pp. 64-65) 
 
He implied that these t tests would each be 
conducted with a Type I error rate of five 
percent. 
Fisher went on in the next paragraph to 
describe a method introduced to the literature 26 
years later by Dunn. He explained that when the 
test is not significant, and yet the researcher goes 
on to examine comparisons suggested by the 
data, much caution should be used. He wrote 
(1935a), 
 
…for if the variants are numerous, a 
comparison of the highest with the 
lowest observed value, picked out from 
the results, will often appear to be 
significant, even from undifferentiated 
material. Properly, such unforeseen 
effects should be regarded only as 
suggestions for future experimentation, 
in which they can be deliberately 
tested…Thus, in comparing the best 
with the worst of ten tested varieties, we 
have chosen the pair with the largest 
apparent difference out of 45 pairs, 
which might equally have been chosen. 
We might, therefore, require the 
probability of the observed difference to 
be as small as 1 in 900, instead of 1 in 
20, before attaching statistical 
significance to the contrast.” (p. 66) 
 
Although testing contrasts, even with a Dunn-
Bonferroni adjustment, after a non-significant F 
test inflates the Type I error rate, it is of interest 
to discuss the LSD procedure. Fisher maintained 
that significance tests reveal facts. Sometimes 
these facts are used to falsify hypotheses, and at 
other times, many such revealed facts can serve 
as the genesis of a conjecture intended to explain 
them. Multiple comparison procedures attempt 
to control family-wise Type I error rates across a 
number of comparisons, which comprise a 
family of comparisons in the sense that a false 
rejection of any one of them would lead a 
researcher to claim as false a statement at a 
higher conceptual level, and which one would 
not like to do in error at a rate higher than the 
adopted alpha. But the LSD method does just 
that. If the F test is not significant, the 
experiment is stopped. If it is significant in error, 
it holds the error rate at the appropriate level in 
falsifying the higher-level proposition, and any 
contrasts examined afterward and found 
significant erroneously do not contribute to the 
overall error rate, because it is already wrong at 
an acceptable rate. If the F is correctly 
significant, one cannot make an error in 
declaring the higher-level statement false, and 
one is thus in fact-generating mode for the next 
attempt at an improved explanation. So Fisher 
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